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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Scott Molen appeals from the judgment of conviction and 
sentence entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct with a 
minor under the age of sixteen 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs 
Molen molested his eight-year-old step-granddaughter, S.Z., while she 
was staying with Molen and Molen's wife, S.Z.'s grandmother, in Garden Valley, 
Idaho. (Tr., p.275, L. l  - p.296, L.1.) While S.Z. and Molen were alone in 
Molen's house, Molen pushed S.Z. onto his bed, removed her clothes, and 
penetrated her vagina with his penis. (R., p.281, L.5 - p.286, L.24.) Molen 
stopped when S.Z.'s grandmother came home and S.Z. was able to get Molen 
off her. (Tr., p.284, L.20 - p.285, L.2.) In addition to having genital-to-genital 
contact with S.Z., Molen also fondled S.Z. (Tr., p.285, L.13 - p.284, L.4) and 
masturbated in front of her (Tr., p.288, Ls.19-22). Molen also made repeated 
sexual advances toward her. (Tr., p.286, Ls.2-11; p.287, Ls.4-14.) Molen was 
charged by information with one count of lewd conduct with a minor child under 
the age of sixteen. (R., Vol. !I, pp.283-84.) Following a trial, a jury found Molen 
guilty as charged. (R., Voi. 11, pp.396, R., Vol. 111, 605-08.) The district court 
entered judgment upon the jury's verdict and imposed a unified sentence of 
twenty years, with eight years fixed. (R., Vol. Ill, p.606.) Molen timely appeals. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.92-94.) 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Molen states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court deny Mr. Molen's statutory and 
constitutional rights to a unanimous jury by failing to give a 
unanimity instruction? 
2. Did the district court err by excluding evidence of S.Z.'s 
sexual knowledge? 
3. Was Mr. Molen's right to due process violated when the 
State used his silence to infer guilt? 
4. Did the district court err by failing to strike an allegation from 
the Presentence Investigation Report? 
5. Does the doctrine of cumulative error require reversal? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues an appeal as: 
1. Has Molen failed to show the district court committed error by not giving a 
special unanimity instruction where the record shows evidence of only one 
distinct incident that involved genital-to-genital contact? 
2. Did the district court properly exercise its discretion and act within 
constitutional limitations by excluding evidence of S.Z.'s sexual 
knowledge? 
3. Was it permissible for the prosecutor to reference Molen's pre-Miranda 
silence for the purpose of rebutting Molen's assertion that he wanted to 
talk to law enforcement when the abuse came to light? 
4. Has Molen failed to show any error, let alone an accumulation of errors, 
that deprived Molen of a fair trial? 
5. Has Molen failed to show he was entitled to strike information from the 
PSI where that information was not speculative or untrue? 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
Molen Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Error Bv Not Giving A 
Unanimity Instruction 
A. Introduction 
Molen argues the district court's failure to give a special unanimity 
instruction constitutes reversible error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-15.) Molen's 
claim is without merit. Molen failed to request a unanimity instruction at trial and, 
therefore, failed to preserve his claim of error absent a showing of fundamental 
error. Here. Molen cannot establish error. He cannot show from the record that 
the state presented evidence of multiple separate and distinct acts, that could 
have, by themselves, been the basis of the criminal count charged by the state. 
Furthermore, because Molen took the stand and denied any sexual interaction 
with S.Z., any failure to provide a special unanimity instruction was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. Miller v. State, 135 ldaho 261, 265, 16 
P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. App. 2000). To be reversible error, any error in the jury 
instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State 
v. Row, 131 ldaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082,1089 (1998). 
C. Molen Did Not Preserve The Issue Of Instructional Error Because He Did 
Not Request A Special Unanimity Instruction And Because He Cannot 
Show Fundamental Error 
Absent a showing of fundamental error, Molen's instructional claims are 
not reviewable. See State v. Johnson, 145 ldaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912, 919 
(2008). "No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an 
instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict ...." I.C.R. 30(b). Molen did not request a unanimity instruction. 
Consequently, he claims fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, p.1 I .) Appellate 
court's may "review[] fundamental errors in jury instructions even in the absence 
of an objection below. Johnson, 145 ldaho at 977, 188 P.3d at 919 (citing 
v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007)). "To determine 
whether there [is] fundamental error, [a court] must first determine whether there 
was any error." For the reasons set forth below, Moten has failed to establish 
error. 
D. Molen Was Not Entitled To A Special Unanimity lnstruction Because He 
Has Not Shown From The Record That The State Presented Evidence Of 
Multiple Separate And Distinct Acts That Could Have, Bv Themselves, 
Been The Basis Of The Count Charaed 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant may be convicted only when a unanimous 
jury concludes that the criminal act charged has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. ldaho Const., art. I, § 7. Ordinarily, an instruction informing 
the jury that its "verdict must be unanimous" will suffice to protect the defendant's 
right to jury unanimity. State v. Nunez, 133 ldaho 13, 19, 981 P.2d 738, 744 
(1999). It is only when the state presents evidence of multiple separate and 
distinct acts, any of which could by themselves form the basis of the count 
charged, that 'Tury unanimity must be protected by prosecutorial election of a 
single act upon which it will rely for conviction or by a clarifying instruction 
requiring the jurors to agree that the same underlying criminal act has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Miller v. State, 135 ldaho 261, 268, 16 
P.3d 937, 944 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Petrich, 683 P.2d 173, 178 (Wash. 
1984) (emphasis in original)); see also State v. Montova, 140 ldaho 160, 167-68, 
90 P.3d 910, 917-18 (Ct. App. 2004). 
The state charged Molen with one count of lewd conduct. The amended 
information alleged that Molen "on or about the lS' day of June, 2004, though the 
3oth day of July, 2004, andlor the 1%' Day of June, 2005, though the 2oth day of 
June, 2005," committed lewd conduct by having "genital-to-genital contact" with 
S.Z. (R., Vol. 11, p.283.) S.Z. testified that while she was staying at the house 
and was alone with Molen in his bedroom that he pushed her on the bed, 
removed her clothes, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. (Tr., p.281, L.l - 
p.283, L.24.) This was the only sexual encounter described by S.Z. that involved 
genital-to-genital contact. Although S.Z. described other sexual encounters at 
trial, such as Molen fondling her when they were watching a movie (Tr., p.285, 
Ls.13-24), and masturbating in front of her (Tr., p.288, Ls.12-22), these 
encounters did not involve genital-to-genital contact and, therefore, did not have 
an evidentiary basis for meeting the elements of the crime with which Molen was 
charged. Indeed, S.Z. made clear on cross-examination that although there 
were multiple sexual encounters and advances, only once was there genital-to- 
genital contact: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
(Tr., p.318, L.25 
Okay. And when you say "did it," what do you mean? 
Did sex stuff? 
Okay. How many times in total did Scott [Molen] ever 
try to put his penis in your vagina? 
All I remember is just once. 
Okay. That was the time where? 
In his bedroom. 
p.319, L.7.) 
Moreover, a review of the record shows that no other encounter between 
S.Z. and Molen included genital-to-genital contact. The state's claim of genital- 
to-genital contact was based on the sole incident where Molen pushed S.Z. onto 
the bed and removed her clothes. In closing, the prosecutor stated that the 
genital-to-genital contact that formed the basis for the charge was Molen 
penetrating S.Z. with his penis: "She also testified that the touching was what 
we're worried about here, the genital-to-genital contact, that the defendant took 
off his clothes, that he got on top of her, that it hurt, and he put his penis into her 
vagina." (Tr., p.906, Ls.18-23.) The prosecutor closed his argument stating: 
[S.Z.] and the defendant have a special relationship, a relationship 
that no child should have with an adult, a relationship where they 
were alone in the house, the defendant had his clothes off. He 
took [S.Z.]'s clothes off. He pushed her down on the bed. He got 
on top of her. He put his penis into her vagina. It hurt. She told 
him to stop. 
(Tr., p.925, Ls.1-8.) The prosecutor further argued during rebuttal: 
You know what he's charged with, genital-to-genital contact. Has 
she ever said that he did not do that? Has she ever said that he 
did not strip her clothes off and push her down on the bed and put 
his naked body on top of her and start moving up and down and 
having genital-to-genital contact? 
(Tr., p.976, Ls.9-15.) 
Because there is no doubt the conduct forming the basis of the charge, as 
presented by the prosecution, was the one instance of Molen touching S.Z.'s 
vagina with his penis in his bedroom while the two of them were naked, Molen 
has failed to establish error based on the lack of a unanimity instruction. 
Although Molen acknowledges "the State focused on one act in 
particular," he nevertheless complains, "the jury heard evidence from SZ that she 
had originally alleged that sex occurred approximately twelve times, and she 
reduced that number to 'four or five' at the trial," and S.Z. "testified that there 
were times that 'privates touched' when their clothes were on . . . " (Appellant's 
Brief, p.9.) The state is unclear of the exact testimony to which Molen refers 
because he failed to include any citation to the record in support of his argument 
(* id.) To the extent he is referring to S.Z.'s grand jury testimony or the 
statements she made during the CARES interview, neither establishes the need 
for a unanimity instruction. 
In addition to S.Z.'s testimony at trial, the state submitted a tape and 
transcript of the CARES interview. In that interview, S.Z. described Molen in his 
bedroom naked, pushing her on the bed, removing her clothes and underwear, 
and "putting his thing into me." (CARES Tr., p.21, L.9 - p.23, L.4.) S.Z. also 
stated, consistent with her testimony at trial, that this was the only time Molen 
penetrated her with his penis: 
Q. "Okay. So there was just one time that his front private went 
in your vagina?" 
A. Uh-huh. 
(CARES Tr., p.73, Ls.1-3.) The state recognizes there were other sexual 
advances described in the CARES interview that could have involved genital-to- 
genital contact. However, the description of those advances did not specify 
where on the girl's body the touching occurred: 
Q. Humping. Oh, you haven't told me about that. Okay. 
What's humping? Can you show me humping? 
A. It's, um, kind of like dogs. Urn, he was going like this 
(indicating). 
Q. Okay. So he was doing that upstairs? 
A. (No audible response.) 
Q. In which room? 
In my room. 
Upstairs in your room he was doing humping. And he didn't 
have any clothes on; did I get that right? 
Uh-huh. 
And what about you? 
I had my clothes on. 
Okay. So you were showing me that his body was moving? 
(No audible response.) 
How was it moving? 
A. Um, forward and back. 
(CARES Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.38, L.20.) While this passage clearly describes a 
sexual advance, nowhere does S.Z. describe genital-to-genital contact with 
Molen. Consequently, because there is no evidence of genital-to-genital contact 
in this passage there is no separate, distinct, and independent instance of lewd 
and lascivious conduct other than when Molen was naked, pushed S.Z. onto his 
bed and put his penis in her vagina. 
Even if S.Z.'s CARES testimony could be construed as referencing 
additional genital-to-genital contact, this testimony, alone, did not entitle Molen to 
a unanimity instruction. S.Z.'s statements at the CARES interview were not 
made under oath and, therefore, were not admitted for their substance. The jury 
was specifically instructed: "Evidence that on some former occasion a witness 
made a statement while he or she was not under oath that may have been 
consistent -- inconsistent with his or her testimony at trial may be considered by 
you only for the purpose of testing the believability of the testimony that the 
witness gave during trial and for the purpose of considering whether any 
suggestion was made directly or indirectly concerning what the witness should or 
should not say while testifying at trial." (Tr., p.891, Ls.5-15 (emphasis added).) 
Consequently, here, where the CARES interview was not admitted for a 
substantive reason, but for credibility, the statements cannot be an independent 
basis for finding Molen guilty of lewd conduct. Accordingly, Molen was not 
entitled to a special unanimity instruction based on statements S.Z. made during 
her CARES interview. 
To the extent Molen relies on S.Z.'s preliminary hearing testimony as 
evidence of other acts entitling him to a unanimity instruction, this argument also 
fails. The state recognizes that at the preliminary hearing S.Z. stated Molen 
penetrated her and had sex with her with on multiple occasions. However, the 
preliminary hearing transcript was never admitted into evidence. Rather, 
portions of the transcript were read to the jury during closing argument by 
defense counsel as argument and not evidence. (Tr., p.870, Ls.13-19.) Defense 
counsel specifically referenced the fact that S.Z. stated at the preliminary hearing 
that Molen had sex with her on multiple occasions. Although this testimony was 
referenced, it is not evidence. I.C.J.I. 204 (provided to the jury here as Jury 
lnstruction No.16). Because it is not evidence, but argument, it cannot be the 
basis for finding a distinct and separate incident of genital-to-genital contact that 
would entitle Molen to a unanimity instruction. Moreover, any error that may 
have occurred in relation to the presentation of this information to the jury was 
invited and cannot serve as a basis for relief. Cf. State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 
389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Blake, 133 ldaho 237, 240, 985 
E. Even Assumina The District Court's Failure To Sua Sponte Give A 
Unanimitv lnstruction Constituted Fundamental Error, The Error Was 
Harmless Under The Facts And Circumstances Of This Case 
In Miller, the ldaho Court of Appeals recognized that even if a district court 
errs by not sua sponte giving a special unanimity instruction, such error will be 
deemed harmless so long as the reviewing court is able to declare, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result even if the 
instruction had been given. State v. Miller, 135 ldaho 261, 268-69, 16 P.3d 937, 
944-45 (Ct. App. 2000). Miller was charged with two counts of lewd conduct with 
a minor under sixteen. At trial, the victim testified as to six separate instances of 
sexual misconduct, any of which could have formed the basis for conviction 
under the charged counts. Although the court of appeals agreed with Miller 
that under such circumstances, the district court was required to have given a 
unanimity instruction, it ultimately found the trial error to be harmless. at 268, 
16 P.3d at 944 
In reaching its determination, the court noted that the case turned upon 
the victim's testimony, which, the court noted, the 'Tury obviously found . . . 
credible, as Miller was found guilty on both counts of the indictment." j&. at 268, 
16 P.3d at 944; see also Montova, 140 ldaho at 166, 90 P.3d at 916 ("By finding 
Montoya guilty, the jury obviously found C.H.'s testimony more credible than 
Montoya's testimony. There is no reason for this Court to conclude that the jury 
would have believed some of the incidents alleged by C. H., but not the others.") 
Applying the reasoning of W r  and Montova to the facts of this case, it is 
clear that any error in lack of a special unanimity instruction was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. As in &r, the only issue the jury had to decide in 
order to convict Molen was whether it believed S.Z.'s testimony regarding the 
alleged incidents of sexual contact. The jury obviously found S.Z.'s testimony to 
be credible, as it convicted Molen. Thus, as in m, the lack of a unanimity 
instruction should be deemed harmless because it is clear, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the jury would have convicted Molen even had such an instruction 
been given. 
Furthermore, here, like in Montova, the defendant took the stand and 
asserted a general denial of all the sexual acts alleged. (Tr., p.635, L.24 - p.636, 
L.18.) As recently explained in State v. Banks, 46 P.3d 546 (Kan. 2002), a case 
cited by this Court in Montova,l40 Idaho at 166, 90 P.3d at 916, a general denial 
supports a finding that the lack of a unanimity instruction was inconsequential: 
In those cases in which the defense to charges based on multiple 
acts is a general denial, differentiation among a number of events 
is not required of the jury and therefore is not an issue in 
controversy. The jury either accepts the victim's testimony as to all 
and convicts, or it accepts the defendant's denial and acquits on all 
charges. The failure to give a unanimity instruction in those 
instances is harmless error; it does not relate to an issue in 
controversy. 
Id. at 551 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accord State v. Hill, 11 
-
P.3d 506, 512 (Kan. App. 2000) ("By the jury's rejection of the appellant's 
general denial, the court could unequivocally say that there was no rational basis 
by which the jury could have found that the defendant committed one of the 
incidents but did not commit the other. . . ."); R.L.G.. Jr. v. State, 712 So.2d 348, 
368 (Ala. Cr. App. 1997) (same); People v. Brown, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Cal. 
App. 1996) (same). 
Under the circumstances of this case, there was no rational basis by 
which the jury could have found that Molen committed some of the acts alleged 
by S.Z. but did not commit the others. Having rejected Molen's general denial, it 
is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same 
resutt even had a unanimity instruction been given. Thus, even if the court erred, 
Molen has failed to show error requiring reversal. 
11. 
Molen Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Excludincl Evidence Of 
S.Z.'s Sexual Knowiedqe 
A. Introduction 
Molen complains the district court violated his constitutional rights and 
committed reversible error when it excluded proffered evidence as irrelevant and 
denied him an opportunity to call witnesses to explain S.Z.'s sexual knowledge 
based on her mother's sexual behavior. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-23.) Molen's 
argument fails because 1) he failed to raise any constitutional claim below and, 
therefore, cannot raise those claims for the first time on appeal; 2) he cannot 
show S.Z.'s sexual knowledge was relevant to whether Molen penetrated S.Z. 
with his penis; and 3) he cannot show that the trial court's determination that 
"whatever probative value [the evidence] may have [was] substantially 
outweighed by the danger of confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and unfair 
prejudice" was an abuse of discretion. (Tr., p.411, Ls.16-20.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court freely reviews questions of relevancy under IRE 401 
and 402. State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 69-70, 44 P.3d 1122, 1124-25 (2002). 
However, whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403 is a discretionary matter that will 
be disturbed only if the appellant demonstrates that the district court abused its 
discretion. State v. Enno, 119 ldaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991); State 
v. Birkla, 126 ldaho 498, 500, 887 P.2d 43,45 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Properlv Limited Molen's Abilitv To Call Witnesses 
Describing S.Z.'s Mother's Sexual Behavior To Explain S.Z.'s Sexual 
Knowledge 
Prior to trial, Molen filed a motion in limine seeking to admit evidence of 
S.Z.'s "past exposure to adult sexual matters through the sexually explicit 
lifestyle, conduct, materials and words of her mother and her mother's friends . . 
. ." (R., Vol. 11, p.285.) Molen generally asserted S.Z. "exhibited hyper 
sexualized behavior," had observed her mother having sex with multiple partners 
and discussed sex with her. (R., Vol. 11, p.293.) Molen argued that this 
explained S.Z.'s knowledge and use of sexual language. Despite these 
generalized assertions of a hyper sexualized environment, Molen's offer of proof 
was limited. Molen only identified S.Z.'s knowledge as it pertained to "knowing 
about oral sex," sex like "doggies do it," and wanting a "tattoo on her pooty." (R., 
Vol. 11, p.293.) Molen also sought to introduce evidence that S.Z. allegedly 
attempted to (1) "French kiss" Molen and her grandmother, (2) watched her 
grandparents having sex, and (3) pulled her grandparents' pants down. (R., Vol. 
11, p.293.) The district court correctly denied Molen's motion because this 
evidence was not relevant to any fact of consequence in this case. This pre-trial 
ruling was revisited during trial where the ruling was affirmed on the basis of 
relevancy and that the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any 
possible probative value. Molen has failed to establish the district court erred. 
1. Molen Did Not Obiect To The Exclusion Of Evidence On 
Constitutional Grounds, And, Therefore. Did Not Preserve His 
Constitutional Claim For Appellate Review 
Molen first claims the district court's evidentiary ruling "denied his right to 
cross-examination protected by the Sixth Amendment and his right to due 
process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution by denying him the right to present evidence. . . ." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.15.) Molen did not raise these claims below and, therefore, has not preserved 
his constitutional claims on appeal. Matters not raised to the trial court are 
generally not preserved for appeal. State v. Rozaiewski, 130 ldaho 644, 645, 
945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997). To preserve an issue, a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court. State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 398, 
3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). That objection must further state the specific 
grounds on which it is based. Id. It is incontrovertible that Molen did not assert 
his constitutional claims below. Therefore, on appeal, he can only claim 
evidentiary error based on the ldaho Rules of Evidence, 
2. The Evidence Shown Bv Molen's Offer Of Proof Was Not Relevant 
To A Fact Of Consequence In This Case 
To be admissible, evidence must first be relevant. I.R.E. 402. Evidence 
that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has 
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be 
without the evidence, is relevant. I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 ldaho 544, 
768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). Contrary to Molen's assertion, the evidence he 
proffered in his offer of proof, other than the instances of "French kissing," was 
not relevant to any fact of consequence. 
The district court concluded, based on what was stated in the offer of 
proof, that S.Z.'s sexual knowledge and use of certain sexual terms was 
irrelevant to whether Molen had genital-to-genital contact with her. After 
receiving the offer of proof, the district court reasoned: "based on what I know 
about this case, the fact that this child saw her mother having intercourse in 
more than one fashion or whatever is not relevant to the facts of this case." 
(06108107 Tr., p.24, Ls.15-19.) Accordingly, the district court denied Molen's 
request to put on witnesses describing S.Z.'s mother's sexual behavior and 
S.Z.'s observance of that behavior. 
With respect to S.Z.'s knowledge of certain sexual terminology, whether 
S.Z. knew "about 'oral sex,"' sex "like doggies do it," and wanted a tattoo "on 
[her] pooty" makes it neither more likely, nor less likely, that Molen put his penis 
in S.Z.'s vagina. Molen, however, claims the evidence is relevant because, he 
asserts: "[ilf jurors are not able to see possible alternative explanations for a 
child's sexual knowledge, apart from the alleged incident, they will undoubtedly 
assume that his or her knowledge did in fact come from the alleged incident." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Even assuming this is true, Molen's offer of proof was 
not sufficient because it was limited to general knowledge of one form of sex, 
"oral sex," the sexual practice of animals, sex "like doggies do it," and the term 
"pooty ." 
This proffered evidence had nothing to do with the allegation of abuse -- 
sexual intercourse with Molen on top of S.Z. penetrating her with his penis. 
Indeed, in her testimony at trial S.Z. did not mention oral sex, doggie sex, or use 
the term "pooty." The only statements made by S.Z. relating to these terms 
comes from the CARES interview. In that interview, S.Z. states that Molen licked 
her genital area with his tongue. She never uses the term "oral sex" but rather 
states that he licked her the way dogs lick each other: 
Q. What kind of licking was he doing right here 
(indicating)? 
A. Kind of like how dogs lick. But he didn't have that big 
of a tongue. 
(CARES Tr., p.51, Ls.23 -25.) 
S.Z.'s testimony about being "licked" like doggies lick themselves does not 
demonstrate knowledge of "oral sex" but is entirely consistent with how an eight- 
year-old would describe that occurrence. Consequently, Molen's offer of proof 
failed to establish the majority of sexual knowledge he wanted to present was 
relevant. 
With respect to S.Z.'s actions Molen sought to introduce, the court 
tentatively ruled Molen could introduce evidence regarding S.Z.'s alleged 
attempts to French kiss her grandparents stating: 
I will allow, however, depending on what comes in with the CARES 
interview and that sort of thing, evidence about her knowledge of 
the question of French kissing. Because that seems to me to be 
clearly relevant, and I'm not sure that that would be precluded by 
the rule on the victim's prior sexual history. And that would include 
evidence of the child having engaged in that sort of thing in the 
past. 
(Tr., p.52, Ls.6-14.) The district court, however, concluded S.Z.'s other alleged 
actions -- watching her grandparents having sex and trying to pull their pants 
down -- was not relevant. The district court properly exercised its discretion by 
excluding irrelevant evidence and permitting other evidence depending on what 
evidence was presented at trial. 
Molen cites a number of cases where alternative knowledge of sexual 
acts was found to be relevant. In addition to being twenty years old and not 
taking into account the advanced sexual exposure and knowledge of children 
today, in each of these cases the alternative sexual knowledge was directly 
related to the victim's abuse. See State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Ariz. 
1988); Summit v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Nev. 1985); State v. Jacque, 558 
A.2d 706, 708 (Me. 1989); State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981). 
Here, this simply is not the case 
As articulated in m r ,  a defendant still must show that "the prior sexual 
act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the 
experience and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge." 760 P.2d 
at 1077. Molen has failed to show any connection between the language in his 
offer of proof and the genital-to-genital contact he had with S.Z. Nowhere in 
S.Z.'s account of Molen pushing her down and penetrating her with his penis 
does she mention "oral sex," sex like "doggies do it," or the term "pooty." As a 
result, S.Z.'s knowledge of these terms, regardless of where it came from, is 
irrelevant to the issue of consequence. Thus, Molen has failed to show error.' 
1 Molen also argues that despite the trial court's pretrial ruling, the state opened 
the door by asking S.Z.'s mother, Tiffany, "did you ever talk to [S.Z.] in detail 
about sex and how she might talk about that if she were to talk to the authorities 
in this case?" (Tr., p.393, Ls.6-8 (emphasis added).) The trial court correctly 
exercised its discretion and ruled the state did not open the door by asking this 
question. (Tr., p.410, L.22 - p.412, L.5.) The question, read in context, shows 
3. Even If S.Z.'s Sexual Knowledge is Somehow Relevant, The 
District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Concludinq That 
Anv Probative Value Was Outweiahed By Unfair Preiudice 
The trial court ruled that even if the evidence outlined in Molen's offer of 
proof was relevant that, here, "the danger of confusion of issues, misleading the 
jury, and unfair prejudice" outweighed any probative value. (Tr., p.411, Ls.16- 
20.) Molen has not shown how this ruling was an abuse of discretion. Pursuant 
to I.R.E. 403, even relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district court's 
discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency to suggest a 
decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the probative value of 
the evidence. State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 
1994). In this case the court clearly understood the standard and its 
responsibilities. (Tr., p.410, L.22 - p.411, L.21.) The court reasoned that, under 
that the state was asking whether or not S.Z.'s mother talked about sex and what 
happened to S.Z. in preparation for her CARES interview: 
Q. Let me ask you this, Tiffany: Prior to the CARES interview, 
did you ever tell [S.Z.] to make up these allegations? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever tell her what to say? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever talk to her in detail about sex and how she 
might talk about that if she were to talk to the authorities in 
this case. 
A. No. 
(Tr., p.392, L.25 - p.393, L.9.) Accordingly, this question was limited and did not 
justify a modification of the pretrial order. 
the facts of this case, the probative value of the evidence proffered was 
outweighed by unfair prejudice: 
THE COURT: Okay. The first issue is: Is it relevant? And your 
argument is that its somehow relevant because she's heard the 
words before and she knew what they were, and she didn't know 
what -- it wasn't because of what may or may not have happened 
with the defendant but because of her prior life experiences? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge 
THE COURT: First of all, I didn't hear anything of the -- well, I'll 
take that back. Okay. I can see the possibility that somehow this 
is tangentially relevant to a fact in issue. Rule 403 provides that 
although relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
As I say, maybe it's tangentially relevant. But I think it is -- 
whatever probative value it may have is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and 
unfair prejudice. 
So the motion in limine stands 
(Tr., p.410, L.22 - p.411, L.21.) The trial court's balancing is supported by the 
record. As set forth above, the offer of proof was limited and not related to any 
direct testimony. There was no connection between the claimed sexual 
knowledge and the act charged. Any relevancy was slight and, using the court's 
word, "tangential." ( T .  p . 4 1  L . 6 )  Additionally, the potential for unfair 
prejudice was great. Molen apparently sought to introduce testimony regarding 
the mother's alleged sexual promiscuity. Such information has the potential to 
inflame the jury. There was, therefore, the possibility of the jury focusing on the 
mother's sexual delinquencies and her role as a mother instead of whether S.Z. 
was molested by Molen. Accordingly, the district court had a basis for finding a 
danger of confusion of issues and the potential for such information misleading 
the jury. Accordingly, the trial court, properly exercised its discretion and upheld 
the pre-trial ruling excluding the evidence on the basis of I.R.E. 403. 
In sum, Molen's argument fails. He cannot show S.Z.'s mother's sexual 
experience or S.Z. knowledge of certain sexual terms was relevant to whether 
Molen penetrated S.Z. with his penis. And, even if he could, he cannot show the 
trial court's balancing of this probative value against the prejudicial nature was 
an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Molen has failed to show error, 
Ill. 
Molen Cannot Show The Use Of His Pre-Miranda Silence For Impeachment On 
Cross-Examination Constituted Error, Much Less Fundamental Error That May 
Be Reviewed For The First Time On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Molen claims his constitutional rights were violated "when the prosecutor 
questioned why Mr. Molen had failed speak [sic] to the authorities and had 
waited until trial to tell his version of events." (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) Molen 
cannot establish that his due process rights were violated because the state is 
permitted use pre-~iranda2 silence on cross-examination for purposes of 
impeachment. Even if the prosecutor's comments could be construed as a 
comment on post-Miranda silence, those comments were permissible to rebut 
Molen's claim that he waited two and a half weeks at home for the police to 
make an appointment with him because he "wanted to give them [law 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
21 
enforcement] every opportunity to see that [he is] innocent." (Tr., p.615, L.12 - 
p.617, L.1.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to remain 
silent is a constitutional question reviewed de novo. State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 
814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998). 
C. The Record Shows The Prosecutor's Questioning Refers To Molen's Pre- 
Miranda Silence And Was Made To Rebut Molen's Assertion That He 
Wanted To Tell His Side Of The Story But Never Had That Opportunity 
Prior To His Arrest 
Under Doyle v. Ohio, 462 U.S. 610 (1976), and Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 
603 (1982),~ it is a due process violation to inquire into a defendant's post- 
Miranda silence. Inquiry into a defendant's pre-Miranda silence, for purposes of 
impeachment does not, however, violate due process regardless of whether that 
silence is pre- or post-arrest. m, 455 U.S. 603; Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 
231 (1980); State v. Lopez, 141 ldaho 575, 577, 114 P.3d 133, 135 (Ct. App. 
2005) Thus, in deciding whether a Doyle violation has occurred, a court must 
first determine whether the inquiry at issue refers to a defendant's pre- or post- 
Miranda silence. Here, the inquiry was incontrovertibly pre-Miranda and, as set 
In m, the Supreme Court held that cross-examination of a defendant with 
respect to post-arrest silence is a due process violation. 426 U.S. 610. In w, 
the Court limited the holding in Doyle to silence occurring post-Miranda. 455 
U.S. 603. 
forth below, was made in order to rebut Molen's claim that he wanted to tell his 
side of the story when the allegations first came to light. 
The issue arose when, on direct examination, Molen testified: 
Q. When these charges came to light, were you approached by 
anyone from law enforcement? 
A. I still, to this day, have not been approached by anyone from 
law enforcement. 
Q. No one ever asked you what happened? 
A. Nobody has asked me one thing about what has happened. 
Q. Was there an appointment made, to the best of your 
knowledge? 
A. Yes 
Q. Did you try to make that appointment? 
A. I was at my home for two and a half weeks waiting for them 
to come and beat me up, whatever they do, arrest me, 
whatever they do or at least come and do something about 
this. 
... 
Q. Did you want them to search your house? 
A. I wanted them to come and see how I lived. I wanted them 
to come and see how my house is. I wanted -- if -- I wanted 
to give them every opportunity to -- see that I'm innocent. 
(Tr., p.614, L.13 - p.617, L.1.) In response, the state cross-examined Molen 
without objection as follows: 
Q. Mr. Molen, you testified that you wanted to talk to the police, 
but nobody called you; is that correct? Yes or no? 
A. Yes 
Q. And you listened to the testimony of [Officer] Tammy 
Kennedy on Tuesday, didn't you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. You heard her say that she called you, and you're saying 
that didn't happen? 
A. I was at my home for two weeks waiting for that call. 
Q. Okay. So you sat at home for two weeks waiting for Tammy 
Kennedy to call you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you wanted to talk to the police so bad, why didn't you call 
them? 
A. I was scared. 
Q. You were scared? Okay. But you know how to call the 
police, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You could have easily called up Tammy Kennedy or any 
other officer asking to tell your side of the story, couldn't 
you? 
A. It was not my job. 
Q. Yes-or-no answer, Mr. Molen. 
A. You bet I could have called them. Sure. 
Q. But you didn't. You waited until you got your chance here to 
listen to all the witnesses and then tell your story, correct? 
Yes-or-no answer, Mr. Molen. 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p.672, L.7 - p.673, L.14.) 
A review of these two exchanges shows that the "silence" referred to is 
pre-Miranda silence. Specifically, Moien's silence when the abuse first "came to 
light." (Tr., p.614, Ls.13-14.) Molen asserts that during this time he "wanted" to 
talk to the police so he could tell them he was innocent -- but was never 
approached by law enforcement. It necessarily follows that if Molen's silence 
predates him talking with law enforcement, it also predates any Miranda 
warnings. Molen has identified nothing in the record that would suggest 
otherwise. Consequently, Molen's "silence" was pre-Miranda, and the use of this 
silence by the state was not a violation of Molen's constitutional rights. 
Even if Molen's silence could somehow be construed as post-Miranda, the 
use of that silence to rebut Molen's claim was constitutionally permissible. Post- 
Miranda silence can be used to (1) rebut a defendant's claim of cooperation, 
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 n.11; (2) correct a false impression created by the 
defendant's testimony, State v. Strouse, 133 ldaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999); or 
(3) inquire into inconsistencies between a defendant's trial testimony and his pre- 
trial statements, Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980); see also State v. 
Wolverton, 120 ldaho 559, 817 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a 
prosecutor may inquire about inconsistencies between voluntary statements 
made during the investigatory stage and trial testimony). 
Here, the question: "You could have easily called up Tammy Kennedy or 
any other officer asking to tell your side of the story, couldn't you?", falls within 
the exception recognized in Strouse, 133 ldaho at 714, 992 P.2d at 163 -- using 
post-Miranda silence to correct a false impression created by the defendant. 
The false impression was that Molen wanted to tell his side of the story when the 
allegations first came to light. The state's response -- "you could have easily 
called [law enforcement] . . . . asking to tell your side of the story" simply rebutted 
that impression. As a result, even if Molen's silence could be classified as post- 
Miranda, it was not a constitutional violation. 
Because Molen has failed to establish any constitutional violation in 
relation to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Molen regarding his unfulfilled 
desire to talk to law enforcement about S.Z.'s allegations, he has failed to show 
error, much less fundamental error. 
IV. 
There Is No Error To Accumulate 
Molen claims there was an accumulation of errors that deprived him of a 
fair trial. Specifically, Molen asserts the previously discussed claims created a 
cumulative prejudicial effect that requires reversal of his conviction. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.31.) Because Molen has failed to establish the existence of more than 
one error, he cannot establish cumulative error. 
The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, 
each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the 
absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due process. 
State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998). A necessary 
predicate to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State 
v. Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Molen has failed to establish the existence of any error arising out of the 
jury instructions, the submission of evidence, or the prosecutor's statements 
referencing Molen's pre-Miranda silence. Because Molen has failed to show that 
any errors occurred in his trial, the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable to this 
case. See, e.q., LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
v. 
The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Declinina To Strike 
Information From The PSI 
A. Introduction 
Molen contends this case must be remanded to the district court for 
correction of the PSI. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.) Molen has failed to establish any 
basis for doing so. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether the district court erred when it denied a motion to strike or delete 
portions of the presentence investigation report is reviewed on appeal under an 
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Campbell, 123 ldaho 922, 925, 854 P.2d 
265,268 (Ct. App. 1993). 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Molen's Motion To Strike 
Portions Of His PSI 
Hearsay information in a PSI must be disregarded if there is no 
reasonable basis to deem it reliable, as where the information is simply 
conjecture. State v. Rodriauez, 132 ldaho 261, 263, 971 P.2d 327, 329 (Ct. App. 
1998). It is sufficient, however, to provide the court with "information to make an 
independent determination on the reliability of the hearsay statements." at 
264, 971 P.2d at 330. Here, the PSI provided information for the court to make 
that determination and, therefore, did not contain information that needed to be 
excluded from the PSI. 
As part of the presentence investigation, the PSI investigator called Child 
Protective Services in Utah County, Utah asking them for any information 
involving Molen during the time period that Molen resided in that county. Utah 
County reported having information on a Scott Molen, born July 30, 1960.~ (PSI, 
p.8.) That information was a claim of sexual abuse of a minor child. (PSI, p.8.) 
The PSI report made clear, however, that the investigator could not confirm the 
claim of child abuse involved Molen because there was no matching record, 
photo, or fingerprints associated with the information -- just his name and a 
partially correct birthdate. (PSI, p.8.) Because the PSI provided the court with 
information upon which it could base an independent determination of the 
reliability of that information, inclusion was proper and there was no basis to 
have it stricken.. Rodriauez, 132 ldaho at 263-64, 971 P.2d at 329-30. 
Here, the judge recognized the deficiency and agreed not to consider it for 
purposes of sentencing. However, the judge did not strike it from the record: 
"Yes. I am not actually going to X it out in the report, but I am certainly not going 
to consider it." (Sent. Tr., p.6, Ls.21-23.) Molen claims this was error, relying on 
State v. Person, 145 ldaho 293, 297, 178 P.3d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 2007), in 
which the court of appeals "recommended[ed]" that a district court "cross out" 
portions of the PSI that are "disregarded by the court at sentencing." The court 
Molen's date of birth is unclear. The PSI provides two dates: July 7, 1960 and 
July 6, 1960. The PSI also notes Molen's numerous aliases. 
of appeals' recommendation in Person does not require a district court to 
physically cross out certain information simply because a defendant requests 
that it do so. Id. This is particularly true where, as here, the information provided 
in the PSI is not inaccurate and specifically notes the inability to confirm the 
information obtained. The fact that the district court ultimately concluded it would 
not consider it did not require the court to cross the information out. 
Consequently, there is certainly no need to remand this case for that purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence entered upon the jury verdict finding Molen guilty of lewd conduct with 
a minor child under the age of sixteen. 
DATED this 12th day of February, 2009. 
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